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CRIMINAL LAW - ACCUSATORY STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS - CUSTODY
TEST REQUIRES MIRANDA WARNINGS AFTER DWI ARREST
A deputy sheriff was informed by radio of a car accident and
that the driver had been taken to a nearby hospital.' The deputy
investigated the accident scene.' He then contacted the police chief
of the town to which the driver had been taken and requested him
to go to the hospital and obtain a blood-alcohol test if he felt it was
necessary. 3 The police chief went to the hospital, located the
defendant, and asked him if he had been the driver of the car at the
time of the accident.4 Defendant answered "yes," agreed to submit
to a blood-alcohol test, and was placed under arrest.' Defendant
1. State v Field;. 214 N.AV.2 404, 403 (N.t). 1980).
2. Ia.
3. Id. Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state
shall be deemed to have given consent ... to a chemical test, or tests, of his blood,
breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose ofdeterming the alcoholic content of his blood.
The test or tests shall be administered at the direction ofa law enforcement officer onlv
after placing such person .. .under arrest and informing him that he is or will be
charged with the offense of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle upon
the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arresting
officer shall determine which of the aforesaid tests shall be used.
N.D. CENrT. CODE 5 39-20-01 (1980).
4. 294 N.W.2d at 405.
5. Id. Defendant was arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
pursuant to section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides in relevant part as
follows:
I. No person shall drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a
highway or upon the public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for
vehicular use in this state if:
b. He is under the influence of intoxicating liquor ....
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-01(1)(b)(1980).
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was then informed of some of his Miranda rights, 6 and a blood
sample was taken. 7 The deputy sheriff subsequently arrived at the
hospital and questioned defendant. 8 Defendant was not advised of
his Miranda rights at this questioning. 9 The trial court suppressed
defendant's response to the police officer and his statement to the
deputy sheriff on the ground that defendant had not been fully
advised of his Miranda rights prior to questioning.' 0 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part."
Noting that it may not be necessary to apply Miranda to routine
traffic offenses, the court held that Miranda warnings should be
given before questioning persons who are in custody for more
serious traffic offenses such as driving while intoxicated. 12 State v.
Fields, 194 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980).
In 1966 the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona," the landmark fifth amendment case safeguarding the
privilege against self-incrimination.14  Miranda required the
employment of procedural safeguards when an individual "has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The following procedural safeguards were
announced in Miranda: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
a right to the presence ofan attorney, either retained or appointed. " Id. at 444.
7. 294 N.W.2d at 405.
8. Id. The deputy "indicated his purpose in visiting [defendanti was to obtain information
needed to complete the accident report form and to issue a citation for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood test and his statements to the police
officer and the deputy sheriff on the ground that he was deprived of his rights under the fourth, fifth,
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and equivalent provisions of the North
Dakota Constitution. Id. See N.D. Co"sT. art. 1, g( 8, 12.
11. 294 N.W.2d at 410.
12. Id. at 409. Another issue raised in Fields was whether the state had the right to appeal from
the suppression order. Id. at 405. Section 29-28-07(5) of the North Dakota Century Code allows
appeals from suppression orders:
An order granting the return of property or suppressing evidence, or suppressing a
confession or admission, when accompanied by a statement of the prosecuting
attorney asserting that the deprivation of the use of the property ordered to be
returned or suppressed or of a confession or admission ordered to be suppressed has
rendered the proof available to the state with respect to the criminal charge filed with
the court, (I) insufficient as a matter of law, or (2) so weak in its entirety that any
possibility of prosecuting such charge to a conviction has been effectively destroyed.
The statement shall be filed with the clerk of district court and a copy thereof shall
accompany the notice of appeal.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29- 2 8-07(5)(Supp. 1979).
Defendant contended that the state had "no right to take this appeal because it failed to file the
required statement along with the notice of appeal." 294 N.W.2d at 406. The court stated that
although it did not condone the more than three-month delay in filing, it did not believe the delay
warranted a dismissal. particularly since the defendant did not challenge the content of the statement
but only the date of its filing. Id.
13. 384 U.S. 436(1966).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Unless the accused chooses to speak after
having been informed "that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence ofan attorney, either retained or
appointed," any statement he makes in response to questioning may not be used by the prosection.
Id.
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action in any significant way."115 The "custody test" outline in
Miranda16 supplanted the earlier "focus test" announced in Escobedo
v. Illinois. 17 Nevertheless, the language of both Miranda and Escobedo
has often been intertwined, 18 and "[w]hat . . . amount[s] to
'custodial interrogation' has given the state and federal courts no
small amount of difficulty. "19
In Beckwith v. United States2° the United States Supreme Court
apparently decided the question of custody based upon whether the
defendant, at the time he was questioned, reasonably could have
believed he was free to go. 21 The Court also indicated that the
"focus test" applies only after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. 22 Thus, the Court decided that "custody" rather than
"focus" determined the point at which Miranda warnings must be
given. 2" In a later case, the Supreme Court found that the right to
remain silent described in the Miranda warnings was derived from
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but did
15. Id. (footnote omitted). Miranda involved four felonies. "In each, the defendant was
questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off
from the outside world." Id. at 445. Each case shared "salient features - inconminicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incrittinating
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights." Id.
16. Id. The Court stated the following:
IT]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory.
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incriitnation. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.
Id. at 444 (footnote omitted). The Court noted in a footnote that this definition of custody "is what
we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had ficused on an accused." Id. at 444
n.4.
17. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo the United States Supreme Court held that when a police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to "focus" on a
particular suspect, the suspect must be informed of his right to remain silent and his right to consult
an attorney. The Court held that failure to inform the defendant of these rights would make all
statements solicited by police interrogation inadmissible in a criminal trial. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). Although the decision was based on the sixth amendment right to counsel,
id., the Court implicitly recognized a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the
interrogation stage. Id. at 488. "Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of
the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
18. See State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d I (N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971), itt which the
court stated that its "reading of Miranda is not that every person questioned in the process of a
criminal investigation must be given Miranda warnings, but rather that these warnings must he given
to any person who is suspected of having committed a crime, or upon whon (he investigation is
focused. -Id. at 14.
19. Alberti v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1265, 1266 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1976)
20. 425 U.S 341 (1976)- Beckwith involved statements made bv defendant taxpayer to Internal
Revenue agents during the course of a noncustodial interview in a criminal tax investigation.
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 341-42 (1976).
21. Id. at 344. The Court quoted United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (2nd Cir. 1969),
when it stated that " '[ilt was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength
or content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which led the
court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning.' " 425 U.S. at 346-
47 (originally stated in United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 790 (2nd Cir. 1968)).
22. 425 U.S. at 347.
23. Id.
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not expand that privilege. 24 The Court stated that "[a~lthough
Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates a limited
exception to the rule that the privilege must be claimed, the
exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently
custodial interrogations for which it was designed. "125
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has had several
opportunities to address the issue of what constitutes a custodial
interrogation for the purpose of Miranda.2 6 In 1971 the court
indicated in State v. Iverson27  that North Dakota's test for
determining whether a custodial interrogation has taken place
entails a combination of the "reasonable man test" and the "focus
test. "28 Cases subsequent to Iverson, however, have indicated that
the court is moving away from the "focus test." ' 29 In State v.
Metzner the court, citing both Iverson and Miranda as authority,
stated that "an accused person must be adequately apprised of his
constitutional rights when the police conduct a custodial
interrogation of the suspect. '"31 The court found that the "total
absence of coercion" in Metzner when "[t]he officers used no threat
of force or threat of authority to induce [the defendant] to cooperate
in their investigation" belied the occurrence of a "custodial
interrogation. "32 Therefore, because there was no "custodial
interrogation," Miranda rights did not attach.
33
Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in determining
whether a defendant should have been informed of his Miranda
rights, considered not only whether the defendant was in custody
during the interrogation, but also whether the investigation had
focused upon the defendant. 34 Nevertheless, the court apparently
24. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980). In Roberts the defendant was convicted of
using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin. Id. at 554.
25. Id. at 560.
26. See, e.g., State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1976); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1
(N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971).
27. 187 N.W. 2d I (N.D. 1971).
28. Id. at 14-15. In holding that Miranda warnings were not required when the defendant was
questioned at a State's Attorney's Inquiry, the court stated that law enforcement officials had "no
information which would lead a reasonable man to believe that [the defendant] was a suspect, upon
whom the investigation would have focused." Id.
29. State v. Leuder, 242 N.W.2d 142, 145 (N.D. 1976). In Leuder the court stated that
defendants are entitled to a "court-appointed attorney only if the investigation has focused upon
them and they have been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom in any significant
way." Id.
30. 244 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1976).
31. Id. at 223. The court then held that the investigation had not "focused" upon the defendant,
as the term was used in Miranda, when police followed footprints from the scene of the crime to
defendant's home. Additionally, no "custodial interrogation" took place when the defendant was
questioned about the footprints. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1976); State v. Leuder, 242 N.W.2d 142
(N.D. 1976).
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placed greater emphasis on whether the defendant reasonably
believed himself to be a suspect than on whether the investigation
had actually focused on him.15 Therefore, the court appeared to be
moving towards the "reasonable man test" and away from the
"focus test. '
36
In addition to the issue of which test should apply is the issue
of whether the Miranda warnings apply to traffic offenses.
37
Although Miranda involved felony prosecutions, the decision was
based on the fifth amendment, which makes no distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors. 38 Nevertheless, a number of courts
have determined that the Miranda rules do not apply to
misdemeanor violations of motor vehicle laws. 39 This particular
issue has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court,
however. When the Court denied certiorari in Lewin v. New Jersey, 
40
Justice White, with whom Justices Brennan and Stewart joined,
dissented from the denial, stating that the conflict needs to be
addressed and resolved.4 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court had
stated in State v. Lewin4 2 that "[tihe law in NewJersey is plain that
Miranda warnings need not be given to a person arrested for or
charged with a violation of the motor vehicle laws such as drunken
driving, before investigatory questioning of him." 43 The Lewin
court was relying heavily on an earlier New Jersey opinion, State v.
Macuk.4 4 In that case the court held that a police officer who had
probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the
influence of alcohol was not required to give Miranda warnings
prior to questioning.4 5 The court stated that the rules of Miranda
should not apply to traffic offenses. 46 Other jurisdictions have
35. 242 N.W.2d at 145.
36. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1978) (discussion of the "reasonable man"
standard).
37. 294 N.W.2d at 409.
38. U.S. CONST. amend V. The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." Id.
39. SeeAnnot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1081-82 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
40. 100 S. Ct. 218(1979).
41. Lewin v. New Jersey, 100 S. Ct. 218, 219 (1979) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
42. 163 N.J. Super. 439, 395 A.2d 211 (1978).
43. State v. Lewin, 163 N.J. Super. 439, -, 395 A.2d 211, 212 (1978). In Lewin statements
had been offered and admitted into evidence in the prosecution of a criminal offense that arose out of
an automobile accident. The court reasoned that because the statements were taken during the
investigation of a motor vehicle violation, Miranda warnings were unnecessary. Futhermore, since
the statements were therefore valid and admissible in a prosecution during which they were taken,
the court found that they were likewise admissible in the subsequent prosecution. Id.
44.57 N.J. 1,268 A.2d 1 (1970).
45. State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 16, 268 A.2d 1,9(1970).
46. Id. The court's reasoning was three-pronged:
First, the type of police questioning involved in motor vehicle violations is not
ordinarily the lengthy, incommunicado inquisition seeking to "sweat out" a
confession at which Miranda was aimed. Generally it encompasses only simple
677
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followed the Macuk reasoning in reaching similar conclusions. 47
At least five theories have been employed to justify not
applying Miranda to traffic offenses.48 Some courts have refused to
require Miranda warnings for persons arrested for traffic offenses on
the theory that since Miranda involved felonies, the thrust of the
decision goes only to felonies.4 9 Other courts have found that giving
Miranda rights to persons involved in traffic offenses causes undue
interference with law enforcement. 50 Another theory for holding
Miranda inapplicable to traffic offenses is that it would be impossible
to provide sufficient lawyers to consult with the number of traffic
offenders who would request legal advice.51 Some courts have tried
to distinguish Miranda by arguing that it was concerned with
preventing lengthy, incommunicado interrogations, which are
unlikely to occur in investigation of traffic offenses.52 Finally, some
standard inquiries for the purpose of a necessary accident or violation police report,
even though some of the information obtained may go beyond the so-called
investigatory phase and be inculpatory as to the violation. The fundamental reason for
the Miranda rules is just not present. . . . Secondly, the violations involved are not
serious enough in their consequences to warrant the time consuming interference
which would result to effective law enforcement and the expeditious administration of
justice in petty offense cases. Thirdly, as a purely practical matter, it would be utterly
impossible to provide sufficient lawyers to consult with the number of motor vehicle
violators who would be likely to request legal advice....
Id. See State v. Zucconi, 93 NJ. Super. 380, -, 226 A.2d 16, 22 (1967). The Zucconi court
stated that "Itihe question is not whether the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel exist in
a motor vehicle prosecution, but whether the Supreme Court intended that in such a prosecution
those rights must always be implemented with the Miranda rules." Id The court concluded that the
police practices described in Miranda as reasons for the adoption of the Miranda rights have no
pertinence to motor vehicle and similar minor cases.'Id at __ , 226 A.2d at 23. See also State v.
Mann, 171 NJ. Super. 173, 408 A.2d 440 (1979) (stopping of vehicle did not constitute in-custody
interrogation).
47. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 10 N.C. App. 663, 179 S.E.2d 820 (1971).
48. See 14 LAND & WATER L. REv. 521, 526-30 (1979).
49. State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972). Noting that all four of the cases encompassed in
Miranda involved felonies, the court concluded that "Itihe fundamental reason for the Miranda rule
simply is not present in the investigation of motor vehicle offenses." Id. at 553.
50. State v. Easley, 515 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. 1974). "ITIhe administration of a warning
would have effectively slowed up and possibly destroyed the investigation of the accident." Id. See also
State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967). After being stopped and arrested for driving
under the influence of narcotics, the defendant made several admissions which were admitted into
evidence in a subsequent prosecution for receiving stolen property. In holding that the defendant was
not entitled to Miranda warnings after being stopped for crossing back and forth over the street center
line, the court stated that "[tihe degree of seriousness, the number of offenses, the burden put upon
police and courts, all militate against extending the Miranda -Escobedo protections to certain types of
traffic offenses." Id. at __, 431 P.2d at 695. Cf Campbell v. Superior Court of Maricopa
County, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971). In Campbell the court held the Miranda decision
inapplicable when the driver is detained no longer than is necessary to make out the citation and have
it signed. The court did point out, however, that warnings must be given prior to any questioning
regarding the state of intoxication of the driver or when an arrest is to be made. Id. at 695. See generally
Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1967)
(discussing the effects of'Miranda on law enforcement activities).
51. State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Mo. 1972); State v. Macuk, 57 NJ. 1, 268 A.2d I
(1970). But cf., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (Court extended the sixth amendment
right to appointed counsel to all cases in which imprisonment could be imposed). See also Project,
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1563 (1967) (indicating that
Miranda warnings rarely caused suspects to request assistance of counsel).
52. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976) (DWI is a breach of law to which
Miranda does not apply); People v. Dorner, 66 Mich. App. 298, -, 238 N.W.2d 845, 848 (1975)
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courts have refused to apply Miranda to traffic offenses by simply
holding that admitting statements into evidence which were taken
without Miranda warnings constituted harmless error.
53
Notwithstanding the authority to the contrary, there is support
for the argument that Miranda is applicable to traffic offenses.
5 4
There is no language in Miranda that indicates the Court intended
its decision to apply only to felonies. 55 The requirement of
apprising an individual of his fifth amendment protections arises
whenever the "privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized." 5 6 Cases holding Miranda applicable to motor vehicle
violations have included both "focus"
57  and "custody" 58
terminology. Regardless of the test chosen, though, the courts
applying Miranda to traffic offenses recognize Miranda's mandates
and refuse to separate offenses by degree in determining the
applicability of constitutionally guaranteed rights.5 9 An Ohio court,
(questions prior to Miranda warnings allowed when investigation had not yet reached an accusatory
stage or focused only on the defendant); McCrary v. State, 529 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1975). The
MfcCrary court field admissible incriminating statements made after a motor vehicle stop but in
absence of liranda warnings. The court based its decision on the totality of the circumstances.
finding they did not "present a compelling police atmosphere with which Miranda was concerned."
529 S.W.2d at 475. See also Tiffany, Field Interrogation.- Administrative, Judicial, and Legislative Approaches,
43 DEN. L.J. 389 (1966) (discussing acceptable police practices in light of Miranda).
53. See State v. Bliss. 238 A.2d 848, 850 (Del. 1968) (defendant suffered no harm from police
failure to advise him of availability of appointed counsel).
54. See, e.g., People v. Weinstock, 80 Misc. 2d 510. - 363 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (App. Term.
1974). The Weinstock court held that "hereinafter the local criminal courts are on notice that
defendants charged with traffic violations and subject to possible imprisonment, must be advised of
their right to counsel and to have counsel assigned where the defendant is financially unable to obtain
same." Id. Cf People v. Scharle, 14 111. App. 3d 511,.302 N.E.2d 663 (1973) (only abstract
published). In Scharle the court held that it was incumbent upon a police officer arresting the
defendant for DWI to inform the defendant of his constitutional rights. The court found, however,
that the admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda was harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. Id. at 478.
57. See, e.g., State v. Darnell, 8 Wash. 627, 508 P.2d 613, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). The
court stated:
Once the trooper had stopped the vehicle for traveling at an exceedingly slow speed
and crossing the center line, had sensed the strong odor of alcohol in defendant's
vehicle, and observed defendant's physical condition, he desired to further confirm his
suspicions by physical tests. It was at that point that the investigation focused on
defendant specifically for the crime charged. Once the trooper's reasoning brought
him to request these tests, Miranda applied, not to the tests about to be performed, but
to any statements defendant might make during the giving of such tests. Once the
Miranda warning was given, defendant would know he could refrain from making any
statements while performing the tests.
8 Wash. at 629-30, 508 P.2d at 615.
58. See, e.g., People v. Ceccone, 260 Cal. App. 2d 886. 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968). (failure of
police officers to give Miranda warnings to a stopped driver was improper because officers had
subjected him to "custodial interrogation''); State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843 (1974).
In Lawson the court noted that "itihe Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda does not limit
the rights it sets forth to persons charged with felonies or misdemeanors ... rather., those rights [are
related] to any individual being subjected to custodial interrogation concerning a criminal charge."
Id. at 328, 204 S.E.2d at 848. (emphasis in original).
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969). The court
stated that there is no indication in Miranda "that one accused of a misdemeanor, who faces the
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speaking of a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated,
expressed no sympathy for the defendant, noting that traffic
offenses are very serious crimes. 60 The court stated, however, that
"the defendant is not a criminal in the usual sense. His occupation
is that of a paper hangar, and he should be entitled, at least, to the
same constitutional protection afforded daily to hardened
criminals.' '61
Thus, it seems that determining when the Miranda rule should
or should not apply continues to be a problem for both state and
federal courts. 62 Courts vary in their interpretations of Miranda,
and they differ in their attempts to determine the appropriate test
and how to apply it.63 As noted above, the exact standard applied
by the North Dakota Supreme Court in determining whether a
custodial interrogation has taken place has also been unclear.
64
In the context of a prosecution for drunken driving, the North
Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Fields faced the issue of what test
governs whether Miranda warnings are required. 65 The trial court
had made the determination that since suspicion had "focused" on
the defendant during the investigation of a car accident, he should
have been informed of his Miranda rights "prior to any
questioning. "66 The supreme court disagreed. It stated that
Miranda warnings are not required when the investigation has
merely "focused" on the defendant.6 7 Instead, "custody" is the
factor that determines the attachment of Miranda rights, because it
was "custodial interrogation" in Miranda that triggered the
requirement for procedural safeguards.
68
The Fields court distinguished language in State v. Iverson,69 in
potential of a substantial prison sentence, must subject himself to police interrogation absent the
fundamental safeguards afforded others." Id. at -_, 258 A.2d at 679.
60. City of Piqua v. Hinger, 13 Ohio App. 2d 108, __ , 234 N. E.2d 321, 324 (1967), rev'don
other grounds, 15 Ohio St. 2d 110,238 N.E.2d 766, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968).
61. Id.
62. Alberti v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1265, 1266 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954 (1975). The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the Miranda definition of custodial interrogation
"enunciates no hard and fast concept of 'custody.' " 524 F.2d at 1267. As a result, that court has
adopted the "approach of deciding the issue on a case-by-case basis." Id.
63. See, e.g., Alberti v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975) (subjective analysis adopted
for determining custody); State v. Mumbaugh, 107 Ariz. 589, -, 491 P.2d 443, 448-50 (1971)
(objective test adopted for determining custody). See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). See
also Note, Miranda v. Arizona. In-Custody Interrogation: An Examination of the New Rules Further Defining the
Suspect's Rights, 71 DICK. L. REv. 116 (1966)..
64. See, e.g., State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215, 223 (N.D. 1976) (court used both "custody"
and "focus" language).
65. 294 N.W.2d at 406.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 407.
69. 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971). The Iverson court stated that "[o]ur
reading of Miranda is not that every person questioned in the process of a criminal investigation must
be given the Miranda warnings, but rather that these warnings must be given to any person who is
680
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which the court had suggested that the "focus test" governed
whether Miranda warnings were required. The court noted that in
Miranda the United States Supreme Court had indicated in a
footnote that its earlier reference to investigatory "focus" in
Escobedo referred to "custodial interrogation. "70 The Fields court
found that North Dakota cases which applied the holding in Iverson
construed it as applying the "custodial interrogation" test.7
Therefore, the court, by distinguishing Iverson and noting Miranda,
held that "custody" rather than "focus" is the proper test for
determining whether Miranda warnings are required. 72
The Fields court also concluded that the defendant's response
to the officer's initial inquiry of whether he had been the driver of
the car was merely investigatory and therefore should not have
been suppressed. 73 The court noted that the defendant had been
neither in custody nor deprived of his freedom in any significant
way. 74 He was in the hospital for medical reasons and not because
of any action of the authorities. 75 The court further pointed out the
absence of a "police-dominated atmosphere. ", 76 The test the court
applied to determine whether the defendant had been in custody
was an objective, or "reasonable man test. ,,77 Thus, if a reasonable
man would believe that under the circumstances he was not free to
go, he would be in custody for purposes of Miranda. The court
found support for adopting an objective test in decisions from other
jurisdictions. 78
suspected of having committed a crime, or upon whom the investigation is focused." 187 N.W.2d at
14.
70. 294 N.W.2d at 407. The position that mere focus constitutes custodial interrogation has
been almost universally rejected. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). the Supreme Court
of the United States determined that a defendant who was questioned at a police station after being
requested to come in was not subjected to custodial interrogation. The Court found that warnings
were not necessary merely because the defendant was a suspect or was questioned at a police station.
Id. at 494-95.
71. 294 N.W.2d at 408. See, e.g., State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977) (Miranda
warnings required before questioning a person in custody).




76. Id. The officer "contacted [the defendant] at the hospital as part of the accident
investigation. He went to check the condition of the driver and, if necessary, to have a blood alcohol
test conducted. Defendant was not taken to the hospital by the officer but by a friend." Id.
Furthermore, the officer's "question was asked at the hospital in the presence of this friend and a
nurse on duty." Id.
77. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has relied on an objective
analysis for determining whether an individual was in custody and, therefore, should have been
informed of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda. State v. Long, 465 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973). In Long the court held that the defendant, who was continuously
accompanied by or in the presence of a police officer from the time he was stopped for questioning
concerning a burglary until he made certain admissions, was in custody and should have been
informed of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda. The court reasoned that under these facts
the defendant "could have reasonably believed that he was in custody. " 465 F.2d at 70.
78. E.g., State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, 507 P.2d 233 (1973) (defendant found not to be "in
Lustody" when questioned in a hospital); People v. Phinney, 22 N.Y.2d 288, 239 N.E.2d 515, 292
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The admissibility of the blood-alcohol test results was another
issue the Fields court addressed. The court found that the
investigating officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for
driving while intoxicated and, consequently, probable cause to
request that the defendant submit to a test for intoxication. " The
trial court had excluded the test results because it believed that
without defendant's admission that he had been driving the car
(which the court considered was the result of improper
questioning), there would have been no probable cause to arrest or
to request that the defendant submit to a test.80 The North Dakota
Supreme Court found, however, not only that the questioning had
been proper, but also that probable cause had been established by
the appearance of the defendant's eyes, the nature of his speech,
and the circumstances surrounding the accident. 8' The court relied
on its opinion that the defendant's admission was admissible
because it was not the result of custodial interrogation. 82 As a
result, it found that the admission was properly used in conjunction
with the other facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge to support probable cause to arrest him for driving while
intoxicated and request that he submit to a blood-alcohol test.8 3
To support its conclusion that the defendant was in custody
when he was questioned by the deputy sheriff, the court again
applied an objective test and noted that because the officer had
placed the defendant under arrest and stayed near him until the
deputy arrived, the defendant would clearly understand that he was
no longer free to go.8 4 Therefore, the court held that the statements
made by the defendant to the deputy were obtained in violation of
his Miranda rights because he had been subjected to custodial
interrogation. 85 The state argued, however, that Miranda should
not apply to arrests for traffic violations. 86 The court considered
this argument in light of a line of cases that relied in part upon the
Macuk arguments.87 The court did not find the reasoning of those
cases totally persuasive, however. 88 The court suggested that
Miranda warnings may not apply to arrests for "routine traffic
N.Y.S.2d 632 (1968) (admission of hospitalized defendant held admissible notwithstanding absence
of Miranda warnings).








87. Id. The court cited the following cases: State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State v
Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972); and State v. Macuk, 47 NJ. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970).
88. 294 N.W.2d at 409.
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offenses where a driver is detained no longer than is necessary for
the issuance of a citation. "89 Nevertheless, the court stated that
warnings should be given before questioning a person who is in
custody for a more serious offense such as driving while
intoxicated. 90 Thus, the Fields court affirmed the trial court's
decision to suppress the defendant's statements to the deputy. 91
The Fields court expressly recognized that a conflict results
when a DWI suspect is given Miranda warnings and is subsequently
asked to respond to a request to take a blood-alcohol
test.-92 The court concluded, however, that "an arrested person
does not have the constitutional right to remain silent when asked
whether or not he will submit to [such a] test. . . . ,,93 The court
indicated that the apparent conflict would be resolved if the officer
gave the Miranda warnings prior to asking the person to take the
test, while at the same time informing the person that if he refused
to take the test, whether by silence or negative answer, his license
would be subject to suspension. 94 Therefore, the DWI suspect is
entitled to be advised of his rights under the Miranda rule, with the
qualification that if he exercises his right to remain silent when
requested to take a blood-alcohol test, his silence may properly be
used to revoke his driver's license. 95
Although the Fields court indicated that an objective standard
should be used to determine whether Miranda warnings are
required, 96 the question of what exactly will satisfy that standard
apparently remains unclear. The "custody test" triggering the
requirement for Miranda warnings was satisfied in Fields when the
defendant was arrested and an officer stayed with him. 97 It is
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); People v.
Bartlett, 82 Misc,2d 152, 368 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1975); State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843
(1974)).
91. 294 N. W.2d at 410.
92. Id.
93. Id. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (forcing a suspect to submit to a
blood test does not constitute compulsory self-incrimination).
94. 294 N.W.2d at 410.
95. Id. Section 39-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant part as follows:
Ifa person under arrest refuses to submit to chemical testing, none shall be given,
but the commissioner, upon receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer,
forwarded by the arresting officer within five days after the refusal, showing that he
had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, and that the person had refused to submit to the test or
tests, shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating
privilege for a period of six months ....
N.D. CENT. CODE §39-20-04 (1979).
96. 294 N.W.2d at 408.
97. Id.
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difficult to say with any certainty, however, what different fact
situations might also satisfy an objective standard "custody test." 98
It is not clear from Fields, for example, whether "custody" requires
arrest or whether "police domination" is enough to constitute
custody. 99 If "police domination" is sufficient, the question then is
what action by the police would constitute "police domination."
Other jurisdictions that have adopted an objective standard for
determining the point at which a suspect is in custody for purposes
of Miranda may provide some indication of how the North Dakota
court might decide in the future. 100 The North Dakota court may
follow the lead of those jurisdictions that have decided the
custody issue based on such factors as the location of the
questioning, the physical circumstances surrounding the event, the
degree of restraint involved, and the objective manifestations of the
law enforcement officers. Thus, arrest might not be necessary to
constitute custody, and "police domination" might be determined
in each case by looking at the various facts of the case.
98. See State v. Mumbaugh, 107 Ariz. 589, 491 P.2d 443 (1971). In Mumbatigh the Supreme
Court of Arizona set forth an objective test for determining custody:
The test is really one of two levels. The first inquiry must be into the existence of
probable cause. Where it exists, it is presumed that the police will do their job and
arrest .... But a finding that no probable cause exists does not necessarily mean that
there was no "custody" or that defendant was not "otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." There exists, then, the second situation where the
police detain someone on mere suspicion where no probable cause exists. In such cases
detention constitutes custody where a reasonable innocent man under the relevant
circumstances would believe he is not free to go.
Id. at __ , 491 P.2d at 448-49. See also State v. Ferrell, 41 Or. App. 51, 596 P.2d 1011 (1979).
The police officer's testimony that he would not have permitted defendant to leave the scene of a
traffic stop did not establish that defendant was in custody, for purpose ofMiranda warnings, absent
indication that such intention was communicated to defendant. Id. at __ 596 P.2d at 1012.
99. See 294 N.W.2d at 408. The court considered a variety of facts in concluding that the
d(iendant's statement was not "the result of a custodial interrogation in a police-dominated
atmosphere. Id.
100. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967). The
Supreme Court of California held "that custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so
deprived." Id. at 448, 426 P.2d at 521, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The California court does not appear to
be requiring an actual arrest to constitute custody. Id. The New York Court of Appeals also appears
not to require an arrest to constitute custody. People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, -, 233 N.E.2d 255,
261, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233-34 (1967). The New York court in applying an objective standard
emphasized, however, that simply because a person is restrained does not necessarily mean that
Miranda warnings must be given. Id. The court interpreted the Miranda decision in terms of
-significant restraint," which it defined as occurring "when the questioning takes place under
circumstances which are likely to affect substantially the individual's 'will to resist and compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.' " Id. (citations omitted).
Federal courts using the objective standard have inquired into the issue of whether there has
been an objective manifestation by law enforcement officers indicating that they intend to deprive the
defendant of his freedom in a significant way. See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered " 'the
extent to which the authorities confronted defendant with evidence of her guilt, the pressures exerted
to detain defendant, and any other circumstances which might have led defendant reasonably to
believe that she could not leave freely.' " Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (9th Cir.
1969) (emphasis and citations omitted) (quoting People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 449, 426 P.2d
515, 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 122 (1967)). The Lowe court held that Mirarda warnings did not have to
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The Fields court stated that "Miranda warnings should be given
before questioning a person who is in custody or deprived of his
freedom by the authorities for a more serious offense such as
driving while intoxicated." 10 1 The court did not, however, specify
what offenses, other than driving while intoxicated, would trigger
the requirement of Miranda warnings. 10 2 The court seems to 'be
leaving itself open for ad hoc determinations. For purposes of
traffic violations, however, the court may decide to apply the rules
of Miranda to only those violations that have not been
decriminalized. 103 The reasoning of Fields would thus affect reckless
driving, negligent homicide, manslaughter, leaving the scene of an
accident, and driving while a license or driving privilege is
suspended or revoked, as well as driving while intoxicated. 104 The
court could consider these violations as those "more serious than
routine traffic offenses" spoken of in Fields. 105
The Fields court stated in a footnote that its decision did not
reach the issue of whether a refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test
could be considered testimonial evidence and subject to fifth
amendment safeguards. 10 6 Several courts have contended that a
refusal to take a chemical intoxication test constitutes evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature within the present scope of
the fifth amendment. 17 Although North Dakota by statute allows
admission of evidence of such a refusal, 10 8 the statute may be
unconstitutional pursuant to the fifth amendment. 0 9  The
argument can be made that since a person has a statutory right to
refuse an intoxication test, admitting evidence of that refusal is a
be given to defendant since questioning concerning the ownership of the automobile defendant was
drivingdid not exceed the "on the scene" exception of firanda. 407 F.2d at 1396.
101. 294 N.W.2d at 409.
102 Id
103. N.D. CENT. CODE §39-06.1-02 (1980). Except for a few specific violations, North Dakota
has decriminalized traffic violations. Id.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE §39-06.1-05 (1980).
105. 294 N.W.2d at 409.
106. Id. at 410 n.5
107. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
881 (1974). Even though the Minnesota Legislature had deleted a prior statutory provision that
prohibited the admission of refusal evidence, the Andrews court held that because a defendant's
refusal "communicates," it is testimonial in nature and therefore constitutes evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature that must be excluded by operation of the fifth amendment.
297 Minn. at 262, 212 N.W.2d at 864. See also Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977) (admissibility of intoxication test results does not mean that an accused person's expression of
his desire not to submit to the test must also be admissible). But cf., People v. Thomas, -
N.Y.2d __, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1979). The Thomas court pointed out that "in no way . . . is
there any compulsion on the defendant to refuse to take the test ... on the contrary, the compulsion
is to take the test. " Id. at __ , 412 N.Y.S.2d at 849. As a result, the court held that the evidence of
refusal was admissible without violating the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.
108. N.D. CENT. CODE §39-20-08 (1980).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Note, The Admissibility qf Refusals in Drunk Driving Prosecutions. A
Violation u/the Fifth Amendnent. 10 PAC. L.J. 141 (1979). But see Cohen. The Case for Admitting Evidence
qfRefusal to Takra Breath Test, 6 TEX. TCi. L. REv. 927 (1975).
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form of compulsory self-incrimination. 1 0 In a footnote, the United
States Supreme Court stated in Miranda that compulsion is present
whenever a defendant is asked a question by a police officer that
requires an answer.'11 Refusal to take an intoxication test would
seem to fall within this category. Therefore, evidence of a refusal
would be compulsory and inadmissible. 1 2 Legislation intended to
reduce drunk driving violations arguably should not be enforced at
the expense of individual constitutional rights. 13
By adopting the custody test for determining whether Miranda
warnings are required, 114 the North Dakota Supreme Court in State'
v. Fields was apparently using an objective standard for determining
when "custody" occurs. 115  The court indicated that a
person is in custody for purposes of Miranda when he is under arrest
or in a "police-dominated atmosphere." 1 16 The court further
implied that custody occurs when a reasonable person would
reasonably believe he was not free to go. ' 17
The Fields court also held that Miranda applies to the offense of
driving while intoxicated, 118 and indicated that other serious traffic
offenses would also require Miranda warnings. 11 9 Although the
court attempted to prevent a conflict between the right to remain
silent pursuant to the Miranda warnings and a refusal to submit to a
blood-alcohol test, by silence or negative answer, 120  the
contradiction inherent in the situation may prove impossible to
resolve in practical application.
MARILYN S. PAGE
110. The fifth amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself... " U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
111. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
112. See People v. Rodriguez, 80 Misc. 2d 1060, 364 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The court
stated that a statute which endeavors to compel such communication under penalty of having the
refusal admitted into evidence, presumptively as evidence of guilt, compels a defendant to bear
witness against himself, in violation of his rights under the filth amendment. Id. at _ , 364
N.Y.S.2d at 790. See also Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972). InJohnson the
court maintained that the defendant did not knowingly waive his constitutional protection against
self-incrinhination, but on the contrary, asserted it. both by not taking the test and by objecting at
trial to the introduction of evidence that he rcfused to take the test Id. at __ , 188 S.E.2d at 418.
113. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (if a statute as applied infringes upon a
constitutionally protected right, that application will be invalid).




118. Id. at 409.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 410.
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